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What is it like to manage an urban public service under
circumstances of budgetary stringency? What are the role perceptions
of such administrators? This paper reports on some recent evidence
gathered o-n this question_ -in London. It is part of a larger comparative
study of responses to urban fiscal crises in the United States and
Great Britain, 1
The material reported on here is.drawn largely from interviews
conducted with local-level administrators, and with national administrators with responsibilities for local services, conducted during
the summer of 1979, 2 While there are some commonalities among these
managers, I will be ar 5uing that there are three patterned distinctions
which divide them.
The first of these distinctions, and the one on which this paper
will report, concerns differences in management between differing
tiers of administration. Budgetary stringency impacts differently,
it can ·be argued, on those parts of the governmental structure with
direct responsibilities for delivery and administration of services,
and those organizations with a more removed mandate. Although
national government is responsible for a wider range of services in
the U.K. than in the U.S., it is nevertheless a characteristic of
both systems to have central government primarily involved in urban
administration as a provider of funds and a setter of rules, and not
in the actual administration or delivery of local services. While we
would. expect budgetary stringency to impinge on both central and local
administrators, the impact ought to be different,
The second distinction, not reported on in detail ·in this paper,
can be found within particular local governments between administrators
serving in different departments. As an extension of the first
distinction, discussed above,we can anticipate variations in response
to stringency between staff and line agencies. The position of staff
agencies, and those who administer them, is in some respects closer
-to that of central authorities than to line administrators within
their own local government. As with many central government personnel,
staff agency personnel, even within local government~ are relatively
insulated from day.;,to-day contact with the most direct effects of
stringency. This is not to argue that they are unaffected, but insofar
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as stringency is related to service decline and client dissatisfaction,
they are not so regularly exposed to these phenomena as are those
administrators with-field responsibilities~
In contrast to central government administrators, however,· staff
personnel of local governments do share an exposure to common local
political controls with their line agency colleagues. Thus, the
effect of stringency on the local political climate, such as might be
expressed through the local Council, does impinge on the world of
local government staff personnel.
The third distinction in the larger study is one which distinguishes between differing types of local governments. Despite the
"smoothing" effect of the British version of revenue sharing (the
Rate Support Grant), local authorities in the U.K. do differ considerably
in their political willingness to engage in local public service
spending. Such a distinction, between authorities which are more
fiscally conservative, and those which place greater emphasis on
service delivery, is a mainstay of British politics,· probably
even more clearly than is true in the United States. It is often a
fundamental distinction between Conservative and Labo1:,1r local ·
administrations.3
Budgetary stringency impacts differently on authorities with
differing historic perspectives on public spending, and therefore we
can expect that managers in _these differing types of local governments
will also be differentially affected. It should be pointed out,
however, that there is little a-priori reason for thMing that
historically conservative local governments will be more or less
responsive to pressures for increases in budgetary stringency.
It can be plausibly argued, for example, that local governments
with a history· of low public spending are likely to b.e under less
pressure to reduce expenditure precisely because expenditures are at
already low levels relative to other local governments. In this
argument, historically fiscally conservative administrations will
feel less pressure to reduce expenditure because the constituency
for such reductions will already have ·gotten its way, and the
"outrageous examples" of high public spending which often form part
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less likely to be present as inviting political targets. Voters
and/or other actors who wish to hold down local government spending ·
will recognize the "prudence" of such authorities, and they will be
largely exempted from either mass public or elite pressure for further
reductions.
Bu~ an·equally plausible argument can be made for the converse.
,!)
,
Authorities which are historically low in public spending are
precisely those where the confluence of local political forces is
such that conservative points of view have more significant influence
than in local governments with historically high spending levels.
Insofar as the pressures for local budgetary stringency receive
national attention (as clearly has been true for both the U.S. and
the U. K. in recent years), such local governments have political
environments which are particularly responsive to such forces.
Even though such communities may begin with relatively low
levels of spending, conservative influentials within such communities
may still think of public spending as being absolutely too high,.
and wish to work to reduce local government expenditure still further.
Authorities in which such individuals and groups have been historicaily
influential are also likely to be particularly open to enhanced
influence from such sources as pressure for fiscal restraint buildSin
national attention. Under this argument, therefore, it is precisely
those local authorities with records of low spending in which the
political attractiveness of further budgetary stringency will be
highest.
Each of these three distinctions arises in examining local.
public management in the U.K. (and, I suggest, within the United
States as well,) But we can also inquire about distinctions bet'Neen
the management climate in British local government as a whole,. when
.compared with that of the United States. I have argued elsewhere
that despite greater formal constraints, British local.administrators
4
can be freer actors than some of their American counterparts.
The reason for this lies in the quite different perceptions of
the "causes" of urban fiscal problems in the two societies. In the
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in the context of national economic policy. Public debate, and
national-level political attention, focuses on local government
spending in the aggregate, and very little on th~ particular spending
patterns of specific local authorities. In the United States, by
contrast, there remains a tendency to "explain" urban fiscal problems.
largely by reference to particular characteristics of the local
government involved.
New York City is, of course, the classic case of such characterizations, qut a similar pattern of explanation can be found in
widespread interpretations of the problems of Cleveland, often
accounted for in terms of the personalities and political preferences
of individuals, particularly the Mayor. More recently, the problems
of Tt!ayne County, Michigan have received considerable national attention,
and this attention centers on· political conflict between the city of
Detroit and its surrounding suburban ring.
For purposes of this study, however, what I want to emphasize
is the climate for urban management, and its expe·ctations about
autonomy. Any discussion of the distinctions~ I outlined above rests
on certain fundamental premises about the p·ublic administrative system.
Of fundamental importance in Britain is the largely national nature
of labor rela t.ions (al though this has been under some stress recently)-,
and the very widely shared norm that dismissal of public employees is
not an acceptable response to budgetary stringency (although there are
some indirect forms of increased unemployment that appear more
possibre politically.)
For both of these items recent extensions of national pressures
for local budget-cutting have had impact. The existence of national
wage settle~ents gives British central government a powerful lever
for the control of total local government expenditures. Intervention
in these discussions is relatively simple precisely because they are
national in scope. Negotiations have high public- visibility, and
any national gQvernment effort to reduce public expenditure would
need to include this particular aspect of spending·in order to be
credible.
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local governments rarely become items for attention outside the
particular community involved, British patterns ensure that wage
settlements which affect almost all local government job categories
will become widely known. Continuing environments of budgetary
stringency change the consequences of this practice.
?!hi~e national agreements had their historic support largely
from employee groups which saw them as a way to bring recalcitrant
local authorities "up to national standard," the practice today can
serve to inhibit public employee union power in environments which
might otherwise be more favorable to such unions. Even if a local
union makes the calculation that its chancesfor higher local settlements
are good, a long history of national negotiation, and ongoing
structures which provide for thi~, make any such change difficult to
achieve.
But to say that employee groups find it difficult to break out
from national negotiation does not mean that the effort will not be
made. An extreme example of tht occurred in the past year in parts
of London, when social workers employed by local government authorities
went on strike seeking higher wages than had been obtained by their
organization nationally. (For some time national negotiations have
included a "London weighting," intended to adjust for higher costs
of living in the capital, but London social worker groups took the
extremely unusual action of seeking to break out of the wage
settlement above and beyond the traditional "London weighting"
exception.)
While all managers interviewed in London argued against making
changes in national settlements, and some London Boroughs took long
social worker strikes rather than compromise on this point, it is
clear that one impact of continuing budgetary stringency has been an
increased challenge to national wage bargaining.
A number of managers discussed a tendency to have an indirect
form of local bargaining, through the local power to reclassify
employees into different categories of responsibility. Even though
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formal responsibility for deciding on job classification within any
particular local authority. Thus, local governments have some leeway
in making adjustments.in wage.rates, by being more or less willing
to reclassify in ambiguous cases. While the historic use of this
leeway was concentrated in local authorities which wished to pay
relatively higher wage rates, budgetary stringency opens the
possibility of its more aggressive use by local decision-makers to
·hold down expenditure by a more restrictive set of practices in job classification. "Grade creep" can operate in a downward as well
as an upward direction.
Budgetary stringency also affects the nature of norms against
employee dismissal. While in a formal sense these remain strong,
and even the new Conservative national government does not suggest
dismissals, this norm too undergoes some erosion as budgetary
pressures increase. Distinctions appear between individuals who
are formal employees of the local governme_nt, and who are therefore
deserving of local government protection against dismissal, and other
individuals, whose work, though funded by local governments, are not
officially on the local authority payroll.
Such individuals, whether employed by private contractors
dependent on local government capital construction projects, or
employees of non-profit organizations funded by local authority
grants, are less secure._ Even quite left-wing Labour-controlled
London Boroughs have been willing to cut· back on grants to outside
bodies, even though it is obvious to all that the result of such
cutbacks will be unemployment for the employees of such groups.
Expectations remain that employees of contracting firms will
not be unemployed as a result of cutbacks in capital spending, but
that these individuals can be absorbed by private-sector construction
work. 3ut this view seems based less on hard evidence, and more on
the political acceptability of forms of budget cutbacks which include
employee dismissal, so long as the local Council cannot be said to be
"firing its own workers." This remains politically unacceptable, but,
as can be seen, the interpretation of who constitutes the Council•s
"dwn workers" is open to redefinition.

-7But changes in norms do not necessarily presage major changes
in behavior. Earlier studies of budgetary practices in Britain
have argued that attempts to introduce more comprehensive budget
planning by the central govern.ment reinforced tendencies to distribute
funds on a "fair shares all around" basis.5 Earlier work of mine
has shown that this tends to be true for British local governments
in periods of budgetary stringency as well. Analyses of successive
budgets· for several local authorities showed relatively little
percentage changes in spending for each of the locally-delivered _
public services (although each of the studied authorities·retained
its own distinctive mix of spending priorities.) 6 ·
In the research being reported on here, local managers were
questioned about the "fair shares all around" approach. Rather than
subscribing to it, as has been the reported British norm, virtually
all respondents indicated that they thought this- an undesirable
approach. They hold ~his view despite some evidence, as I indicated
above, that this is exactly the approach their local governing bodies
have taken. What we havehere is a change of norms, but significantly
less of a change in behavior.
Why this disjunction? I would argue that·periods of budgetary
_ stringency reduce the amount of slack in any department's operation,
and so make its managers considerably more sensitive to what might
otherwise be seen as quite marginal changes. It is one thing to
demonstrate that spending mixes remain stable, but quite another
for the administrator of a particular service to feel that this is
true when his day-to-day tasks revolve around responding to specific
stringencies imposed on his own department. The nature of budgetary
stringency itself, therefore, can make administrators feel less
collegial, and.less willing to continue to articulate harms which
emphasize collegiality~ even when the realities of budgetary shares
remain quite ·constant.
Thus, it can be seen that budgetary_stringency does impact upon
some long-standing attitudes in British public management, and
produces changes in these attitudes. Not only is the adherence to
"fair shares" collegiality decreased, but local managers can no longer
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as easily take for granted that wage bargaining will be treated as a
national matter not requiring their direct involvement. Nor can
manageE take for granted that strong public and elite attitudes
prohibiting employee dismissal will remain operative. The definition
of "public employee" is susceptible to change, at least at the margins,
and a number of manageB indicated that although they did not anticipate
significant dismissals in local public service anywhere in the
country, that the national budget proposals of the new Thatcher
government (which include considerable reductions in central government
aid to local government) did make such a development conceivable in
ways that had not previously been true._
Urban Management on Three Levels
As I indicated above, budgetary stringency not only changes
the overall managerial climate, but does so in differing ways for
'
different groups of administrators. This can best be seen by
examining administrators at different levels of British government.
In 3ritain, the·part of central government with the greatest
responsibility for local administration is the Department of the
Environment. (This department's title is something of a misnomer •
. It is the successor to the Home Office and has, among its other
responsibilities, control of the administration of revenue-sharing,
and development of the revenue-sharing formulas. Since central
government funds approximately two-thirdsof all local expenditure
through this item (the Rate Support Grant), the details of its.
calculation (andre-calaulation) are perhaps the most important point
of interaction between central and local governments in Britain.
Administrators in the DOE, therefore, are acutely conscious of' the
financial position of local government and are,in an important sense
affected by this (even though their own departmental resources are,
of course, centrally.provided.)
As with much of British political practice, central control of
local government is largely dependent on unwritten understandings.
Thus, the central government has the direct authority to set revenue-.
sharing levels, but can only give advice to local authorities on how
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the DOE to local authorities, and calculations in the Rate Support
Grant formula are.determined in part by central government preferences
as to the spending priorities of local authorities, but these
directives do not have the force of law.
From the perspective of one· DOE official with responsibility
f.or Rate Support Grant calculations, most local authorities followed
government advice, at least most of the time:
"It's a paradox. There are 405 local authorities.
History shows that they are remarkably of one mind .••
A statement from central government is relied upon to
an amazing extent by local authorities in their internal
discussions. There is a view that they ought to do so
and follow central government directives."
When asked why local authorities tend to act in this way, this same
official argued that:
"People around here (the DOE) know that they've got
no sanctions if their bluff is called. It might just be
a British gentleman's agreement •. A tacit understanding
that local authorities won't take advantage. If a few
local authorities are bent on doing something different,
it isn't worth having a big fuss about it. This is a
useful cushion (for us) against having to take difficult
positions."
But budgetary stringency did affect the pattern:
"We can get away with formula changes (in the methods
used to calculate the Rate Support Grant) more easily
when expenditures are growing. The political impact of
cuts is more important,"
Thus, from the perspective of this central government official,
national decisions essentially determined the mix of local government
spending, but this type of unwritten control was more difficult to
exercise in times of budgetary stringency than when fiscal constraints
were looser.
Another DOE official thought that budgetary stringency might
lead to greater exercise of priority-setting at the local level:
"In emergency cases (of budgetary stringency) everybody
does across the board cuts ••• On a longer term basis, if
we're going to have the drastic cuts implied by the
Conservative (Party) manifesto, these will be delegated
to local authorities ••• The situation requires cuts to be
political decisions at the local level."

-10The central government might be able to impose a requirement that
local authorities cut their spending, but would not want to
become involved in making too many_choi-ces within the overal spending
totals it might assign.
_A third DOE official's experienee indicated that this is
present practice. This individual was part of a group of DOE civil
servants who had been assigned to work on the staffs of local authorities
for a year in an-effort to give the DOE a better picture of just-how
local authorities did in fact respond to central government directives.
This type of exposure produced another perspective:
"They (local authorities) delineate for themselves areas
where central government had a reasonable intervention,
while others were out of bounds ••• Local authorities get a
Publi-c Expenditure White Paper, delineating service by
service what they should spend .•. Authorities will say the
only area where central government could (legitimately)
control was the total .•• figure •• They said, we take this
as a strict limit, but we decide priotities. 11
"It is extremely rare for an individual authority to follow
(our recommended) service-mix. 'Swings and roundabouts'
effect (things cancelling each other out)·leaves total
as we set it with a~sociations of local authorities ••.
This has been acceptable so far to central government
because it works."
This official, on the basis of his own expsoure to local government, and familiar with the experience of his colleagues on the
project assigned to other local governments, saw wider scope for
local choice than did his colleague who only served at the central
government level. Budgetary stringency produced strains:
"They have to define low priorities .•• But the bulk of
the budget is committed expenditure, which they wished
to continue ••• Defining the lowest priorities was very
traumatic for them. They find it difficult to decide
what are their lowest priorities. They have no objective
measures~- •• What matters is who's powerful ••. Big spending
committees (within the local authority) have more powerful
chairmen and chief officers, so thereqs a bias toward
big spending committees."
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Thus, this officiai saw a range of local discretion, and
budgetary stringency produced "trauma" but retained this local
discretion. This official had served with two London Boroughs.
One, which he characterized as a "good borough," accepted the
centrally-determined total budget figures, but set its own
priorities. His second experience, in a "bad borough," was one
where the borough "ignored central government and went its own way,"
- a way which produced much higher spending totals than the DOE had
urged.
W~jwe should notice about these characterizations is that
being seen as "good" or "bad" by the DOE would have no effect on a
borough's allocation:
"The way the grant system works, i.r an authority overspends
wildly, the penalty is spread over everyone, 11
And we can also notice that even the "good borough" went its own way
on priority-setting, but was "goodtl because it,adhered to spending
totals recommended from above, not because it followed the recommended
service mix.
But we can also examine the impact of budgetary stringency from
the rather different perspectives of the receipients of central
government grants. Although the Greater London Council (the London
metropolitan government) is not a direct receipient of Rate Support
Grant.funds, it does receive comparable forms of aid from central
government, and its own budget decisions can impact on those_of the
London Boroughs below it. (The reorganization of London area
government i~ 1963 sought to describe the range of functions to be
performed by the GLC and those to be performed by the London Boroughs,
but, probably inevitably, there is considerable overlap and conflict
between the two levels.)
From the perspective of the Greater London Council's Treasurer's
Department, things looked somewhat different than they did at the
Department of the Environment. As one officer at the GLC put it:
"We feel under considerable constraint and moral pressure
(from central government) that we have no choice but to
respond to •.. we fear that if we didn't agree with central
government, they would be bound to bring recalcitrant
local authorities into line."
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conclusion that British local government managerswere under less
constraint than some of their American counterparts, argued:
"I agree, it's less, but it's not free ••. We can take.on
(central) government on revenue expenditure, but there is
a strong threat to take powers in future (to control this
type of local spending) if an authority is out of line."
And, this officer pointed out:
""V!e are very much directed by (central) govern.11ent on
capital expenditure."
Because borrowing had to be approved centrally, local governments
could not seriously diverge from central priorities on·new
construction, unless they had the resources to finance this out of .
their own current revenues.
Budgetary stringency had its impact in two ways. One was the
implicit threat to limit the freedom of local governments to spend
as they chose. : Absent any constitutionally-ordained federal structure,
the n,ational government could, by Act of Parliament, require compliance
from local authorities. Anticipated feeback -- desire by local
authorities to a.void this possibility, made them comply with central
directives even when they were not formally compelled to do so, in
this view.
However, the second major impact of budgetary stringency is more
problematic in ;its impact. Several GLC officials indicated that one
consequence of stringency was an increase in the consultative
processes between central and local governments. This process can
itself be seen in two ways. On the one hand, it can, of course, be
interpreted as a sign of growing power for l0cal authorities as
their avenues for influencing the decisions of central government
departments increases. But it can also be seen as co-optation. As
one GLC officer put it:
"All the time we're compromising ourselves. Once we're
a party to a discussion it's very difficult to attack
them and get into a conflict situation."
From this same officer's perspective:
"There is increasing domination by Whitehall, and less
scope for local initiative .•. Traditions of homogeneity
in British local government are growing. There is a
growth of·looking to Whitehall for guidance for public
expenditure."
·
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quoted earlier:
"If one or two local authorities step out of line,
central government will step in."
But despite these general observations, discussion of the
details of GLC budgeting practices and spending practices revealed
greater flexibility. A special case of this flexibility arises
·around the role of "user fees." Discussion of the responses to
Proposition 13 in California often suggest an increased reliance
on user fees as one possible response of fiscally strained local
govern.rnents. Such fees, however, are usually at the margins of
American fiscal debate. The services which might be funded in this
way, such as recreation, are largely marginal to the central
responsibilities of the local governments involved, and the amounts
raised are not all that significant.
The matter is somewaht different for the GLC. Although public
housing is a shared responsibility between the GLC and the London
Boroughs, and there -are ~lans for the GLC to divest itself of much
'Of its remaining housing function, public housing remains a major
element in GLC budgets.· Since rent levels are largely set by the
local government, one choice-always open to close any budget gap
is to increase public housing rents, and thereby reduce the sbusidy
which mllit be provided to the Housing Department. Jecause public
housing is used by a much larger fraction of the British population
(and especially in London) than is true for the United States, debate
over housing rents is both a highly salient public issue and a
possible place for significant budgetary· impact through rent increases.
A second "user fee" available to the GLC derives from the fare
structure of much of London's mass transit system. Busses and the
underground, run by London Transport, draw a heavy subsidy from the
GLC. Although London fares are already high (a_trip from one end of
the metropolitan area to the other could easily cost several dollars
on the Underground), the generally lower level of automobile use, and
much higher gasoline cost, means that private transportation is not
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case in the United States. The fare, therefore, is an attractive
locale for London budget-makers to increase their locally-generated
reveneus.
As an indicator of the relative political power of the users
involved perhaps, rents from GLC public housing pay only approximately
one-third of the costs of running GLC housing estatei,,while the
Underground portion of the London Transport system actually generates
a profit. (The losses on the bus system, however, leave the entire
transport system in considerable deficit.)
A GLC official, noting the major impact of these two types of
charges, suggested that when faced with budgetary stringency,
particularly when the central government was reducing its aid, that
the GLC had three revenue sources from which such deficits could
be recovered, rents, fares, and, of co~se, its own property tax.
(From a purely technical point of v.iew the GLC does not levy its
own property tax, this is a responsibility of the London Boroughs.
However, the GLC issues "precepts" (surcharges) on the borough's own
property taxes. The rates for this are a decision of the GLC, and
the boroughs are merely the collection vehicles for this tax.)
Because of this triple stream of revenues, in5addition to
central government aid, the .constraints which operate upon the GLC
are less strictly financial ones, and more the self-imposed type
which comes from its leaders' perceptions of what might happen if
they deviated too much from central government policy concerns.
Greater London may, in this sense, be in no danger of going
financially bankrupt, but its precarious political position between
the central government and the main local taxing and spending authorities,
the London 3oroughs,· means that the risk of political ,bankruptcy
is always present. Given this type of pattern, it is not surprising
to hear that GLC managers are acutely sensitive to the potentials
for increased central government control of their activities and are,
therefore, likay to be deferential to its spending wishes.
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themselves are both more and less strong. As the major local
government entities, the boroughs seem in no danger of political
emasculation. They are, however, heavily dependent on central
government resources, primarily the Rate Support Grant, for very
heavy shares of their local public spending, and require central
government permission for new capital borrowing.
Thus, the Chief Executive of one Inner London borough could
argue that although c~ntral_government pressure for budgetary
stringency was a "constant problem," central government attempts to
control how the Council spent its funds weres
"largely rhetorical. It's the local authorities which
set the priorities ••• There is a central govern.~ent
inspectorate (a central auditing body), but there aren't
very many of them."
Equally important, central government had no ability to control the
amount of locally-generated counc.il revenues
"There is no ceiling on the level of rate demand, and
there is no ceiling on levels of rents."
Even for the immediate future,. this Chief Exe cu ti ve anticipated no
cutbacks in his own borough's spending, because of its designation
as a ~'partnership area." This program, a form of special aid to
inner~city neighborhoods, was designed to be spent on new programs
attacking geographically-concentrated pockets of poverty. But,
in a form familiar to American observers of similarly-targeted Federal
aid programs, this Chief Executive still felt, even after the first
Thatcher budget that:
"I don't think we face an immediate prospect of spending
less in future years in real terms, largely because we
have been designated a partnership area. (Although) we're
only allowed growth in partnership services, we're
negotiating to use partnership money for ongoing services."
And, he expected, his borough would- be able to do so, since the
central government's review procedures were limited, and the borough
would not be exceeding the totals for central government aid allocated
to it.
A Chief Executive in an affluent suburban London borough presents
a picture with both contrasts and similarities:
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largely a question of local authorities following
central government advice. Their only control is over
grants."
But:
"Most locai authorities have stayed close to (central)
government guidelines ••• We believe local authorities should
do what they like. But some local authorities do literally
what they like and they pay scant regard to their ratepayers and rates tend to go up more rapidly."
Thus, for officers in this Conservative jurisdiction, the proble~
with local authorities"doing literally what they like" is not that
central government priorities are altered, but that local taxpyaers
get higher tax bills. Their own authority is a "responsible" one,
since it carefully adheres to government limits on spending totals.
Nevertheless:
"We take the view strongly that we know the·local area
and the proper mix of services, and so we woulc:ln't pay
so much regard to the (central) government's point of
view of our balance (of services)."
One of the prime concerns about the impact of nationally-dictated
budgetary stringency was the possibility that. the central government
might decide to exercise tighter controls. The top officers of this
suburban borough seemed less concerned with controls on total spending,
since they, and their local political supervisors oh the Borough
Council, shared norms of holding down public spending, Rather, the
risk is that:
"the current government might take statutory powers to
force local authorities to do what (the central government)
want. This would be very bad."
"Some would say that (thoselocal authorities which overspend
government guidelines) should be brought into line,"
but up to now:
"Circulars (from central government) are only advicegiving documents. They always say it is ultimately up to
the local authorities to do what they want."
For their own borough, the constraints seemed more locally political:
"The Government gives us less money than we would like to
have, and therefore the rate increases •.. We tend to ~try
to keep the rate increase low, and there is a good case for
no increase at all in the rates."
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local public spending in this borough came not from the aid formulas
of the central government, but from local political resistance to
tax increases. But both Inner and Outer London managers agreed that·
despite budgetary stringency, and·central government suggestions
on how available funds ought to be allocated, that they had been
able to retain local control over priority-setting.
Conclusion
r,rhat we can see then, is that the impact of budgetary stringency,
and its imposition on local government in Britain~ is perceived
somewhat differently by managers on different tiers of thegoverrtmental
system. Central authorities see themselves as relatively weak actors,
able to exercise control over their own aid distribution, but not
able to make significant inroads on local priori ties.
Second-tier officials of the Greater London Council see central
control as stronger. From their point of view, central government
is able to get its way not only because of its control over aid,
but also because of the co-optation of local government officials.
Since local officials participate with central government in formulating directives, it is hard for many of them to then resist
central advice. Perhaps more significantly, the extent and detail
of central advice sets the agenda for local debate, .and reduces the
likelihood of strong independent local initiatives in prioritysetting.
The lowest tier, but by no means the weakest, consists of the
Londo~ 3oroughs. From the perspective of chief officers at this
level, central government aid sets the parameters within which they
must operate, but, at least up to now, they retain control of their
own services, and feel able to decide upon which they wish to
emphasize or de-emphasize.
Although I have argued that there remains considerable scope for.
free local initiative on public spending, even in the face of national
budgetary stringency, there is a widespread view among Eritish local
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-18authorities that central control is too pervasive. Thus, all of the
organizations y.,hich represent the.various typesor' local government
in England jointly produced a Review of Central Government Controls,
which argued that:
"the general objective for the future should be to
leave as much as possible of the policy making for,
and management of, local services to local authorities
while Government concentrates on: maintaining only that
influence on the aggregate of local authorities'
.
expenditure which is necessary for macro-economic control;
(and) the evolvement of broad national strategies within
which local authorities and other bodies have the
responsibility for operating. Many existing controls go
far beyond what is necessary to Government for these
purposes."?
And the British Social Science Research Council, in a review of
Central-Local Rela tionshii.)S, reported "intensified wrangling" in
recent years between central government and local authorities. 8
The Greater• London Council, the politically weakest tier of
the London governmental structure, commissioned an inquiry of its
relations with other tiers of government which concluded that for the
GLC to be reinvigorated, central government would have to:
"concede authority over the disposition gf resources
within its global allocation to London,"/
and that the GLC should be a more significant allocating; authority.
I emphasized earlier that local government budgetary stringency
in Britain begins from a different basis than in the United States,
and that a fundamental distinction is that budgetary problems in the
·i
U.S. are often seen as having local roots, while those in Britain
are perceived as a part of national economic problems. These
differing perceptions clearly affect the types of response that
British public administrators make to the problem. Rather than
needing to defend the particular record of their individual community~
they are freer to continue to pursue their own priorities, and to
continue to press for less constraint from central government over
these issues.
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